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STUDENT NOTES
TORTS-THE HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE IN KENTUCKY.
In a recent Kentucky case,' the plaintiff, who was on defendant's
street railway tracks which were located on a public street, was struck
by one of defendant's cars driven by the motorman, a servant in the
employ of the defendant. It was admitted that the plaintiff was negli-
gent. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant. On appeal,
a new trial was ordered, and Judge Richardson, in his opinion said
that the jury was to be instructed that, despite the negligence of the
plaintiff, it is to find for the plaintiff if it finds that the motorman in
charge of the defendant's street car failed to exercise ordinary care to
avoid injuring the plaintiff, aftdr he discovered, or by the exercise of'
ordinary care could have discovered, the plaintiff's peril.
By this decision, the Kentucky Court of Appeals again recognized
what, in other jurisdictions, is often called the "humanitarian doc-
trine,"2 but is so designated by the Kentucky court only in the prin-
cipal case. The fact that a plaintiff was contributorily negligent has
been repeatedly held to be no bar to recovery in Kentucky for injuries
inflicted by a defendant who could have avoided the accident had he
used ordinary care to discover the plaintiff's imperiled condition.3
The humanitarian doctrine, which is an extension of the last
clear chance doctrine, is a recent development in the ever progressing
law. Not until 1842, when the famous case of Davis v. Mann,' 4as de-
cided, did the courts hold that a plaintiff was not necessarily barred
from recovery because he was contributorily negligent. By the de-
cision in that case, the responsibility fell upon him who had the last
clear chance of avoiding the result. By extending this, the courts
came to allow recovery where the defendant would have had the last
clear chance to avoid the accident had he discovered the plaintiff's
peril, the policy being that human beings must be protected from harm
even though they absent-mindedly or fool-heartedly fail to look out
for themselves.
However, as far reaching as is the humanitarian doctrine, the
Kentucky courts require operators of vehicles to keep a lookout, for
persons only at those places along the road where they are likely to
'Mullins v. Cincinnati, Etc., Ry. Co., 253 Ky. 156, 68 S. W. (2d)
790 (1934).
2 Sullivan v. Gidern & N. L R. Co., 247 S. W. (Mo.) 1010 (1922).
* Cahill v. Cincinnati, Etc., Ry. Co., 92 Ky. 345, 18 S. W. 2 (1851);
Crowley v. Lou. & X. R. Co., 55 S. W. (Ky.) 434 (1900); Flynn v. Lou.
Ry. Co., 110 Ky. 662, 62 S. W. 490 (1901); Ill. Cen. R. Co. v. Tolar's
Adm'r., 169 Ky. 114, 183 S. W. 242 (1916); Lou. & X. R. Co. v. Earl's
Adm'x., 94 Ky. 368, 22 S. W. 607 (1893).
410 M. & W. 546 (1842).
Cases cited, notes 1, 2, and 3, supra.
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be. In the case of Ohio Valley Electric Railway Co. v. Payne, the
plaintiff, who had been knocked to the tracks of the defendant street
railway company at a place located several feet from the highway and
hence where no one was expected to be, was run over by a car driven
biy a servant o" the defendant. The court *held that there was no
duty of lookout under these circumstances and that the motorman was
negligent only if he failed to exercise ordinary care after he dis-
covered the plaintiff on the tracks.
In the case of Cahill v. Cin., Etc., Ry. Co.,' the court, referring
to trespassers on the tracks of railroads, said "the only duty a rail-
xoad company owes to such persons is to use reasonable diligence
to prevent injuring him when his actual peril is discovered in time
to do so." This statement is but dictum, yet in view of the Ohio Valley
-case,
8 it represents the probable attitude of the court.
Thus we see that in applying the humanitarian doctrine, the
place where the injury occurs is important. Should an injury occur
where those in charge of a train had a right to expect a clear track,
and a trespasser is struck and injured, the company cannot be held
liable unless its servants could have avoided the injury after they had
.-actually discovered the peril of the person injured. But where the
injury occurs at a much traveled public or private crossing or other
place where those in charge of the train might reasonably expect
p.ersons to be on the tracks, then the welfare of the public demands
that the railroad company keep a lookout to protect the lives of those
who are on the tracks. Nor is there a great hardship imposed on the
company to require such a lookout.
The humanitarian doctrine is more than an exception to- the law
,of contributory negligence-it is a rule based on the precepts of
humanity and natural justice for the preservation of those who cannot
-or who will not look out for themselves.
WILLIAM1 MELLO:.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-LIABILITY OF A MARRIED WOMAN
-AS SURETY.
In a recent Kentucky case,' defendant, a married woman, executed
her own promissory note to enable a payee to borrow money. .The
payee pledged defendant's note as collateral.to secure his own indebt-
-edness evidenced by another note which he himself executed. The
.action was brought on the note executed by defendant to the payee.
'213 Ky. 590, 281 S. W. 523 (1926).
T Note 3, supra.
8 Note 6, supra.
I Cawood v. Madison Southern National Bank and Trust Co., 251
Ky. 637, 65 S. W. (2d) 734 (1933).
